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R&D/Marketing Communication 
During the Fuzzy Front-End 
Rudy K. Moenaert, Amoud De Meyer, William E. Souder, and Dirk Deschoolmeester 
Invited Paper 
Abstract-The planning stage of an innovation project has a 
great effect on the commercial performance of the project. During 
the “fuzzy front-end,” the organization formulates a concept of 
the product to be developed, and determines whether or not the 
organization will invest resources in the concrete development 
of the idea. The integration of R&D and marketing activities 
is a necessary condition for success in innovation projects. The 
research question of this study is: from an information pro- 
cessing perspective, what role does information transfer play in 
integrating R&D and marketing functions during the planning 
stage, and what effects do project formalization and project 
centralization of R&D and marketing planning activities have 
on the efficiency of marketing and technological uncertainty 
reduction? The authors use an expostfucto research design to test 
the propositional model. The findings show that successful project 
teams are characterized by a maximum uncertainty reduction 
during planning, i.e., by a maximum decrease of R&D and 
marketing task variability, and a maximum increase of R&D and 
marketing task analyzability. Information flows between these 
functions help them to achieve this efficient uncertainty reduction. 
While project centralization has a negative effect on efficient un- 
certainty reduction, project formalization is curvilinearly related 
to the amount of uncertainty reduced during planning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ESEARCH on the factors determining product inno- R vation success has received almost constant attention 
ever since the results of the SAPPHO-study [85] have been 
published. The greater part of the empirical studies have been 
directed towards uncovering the characteristics of successful 
product innovations. Among the factors that have become 
constant themes as important discriminators between new 
product success and failure are: the degree of product su- 
periority, the level of technological and marketing synergy 
with the existing capabilities of the firm, the implementation 
and the use of a new product development protocol within 
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the innovating firm, the management of the interface between 
different functions and departments, the presence of product 
champions, and the level of support project members receive 
from top management [181, [23], [30], [361, [611, [66l, [671, 
[87l, 1901, [93l, [1021. 
This stream of research has consistently underlined the 
impact of the R&D/marketing interface on project success 
[7], [21]. [91], [93]. Also, it has been repeatedly shown that 
the proficiency of the planning stage activities is a major 
discriminator between commercial success and failure [ 191, 
[36], [63], [93]. A probing question then arises: what is 
the impact of the R&D/marketing interface during the ‘tfuzzy 
front-end” [89] on innovation project success? The extant 
empirical studies do not enable us to postulate conclusive 
statements regarding this issue. First, the studies that have 
investigated the effect of new product development activities 
on project success, have not examined the interfunctional 
interfaces for each of the innovation cycle stages separately 
(e.g., predevelopment, development, launch). Second, the use 
of certain data analysis techniques (e.g., varimax rotation 
of principal component solutions) has imputed orthogonality 
among the independent variables. Rather than building a causal 
model, this statistical approach has resulted in juxtaposing 
independent variables [64]. Finally, the evidence at hand has 
been gathered through exploratory qualitative studies rather 
than through conclusive quantitative studies [49]. 
Many studies on the R&D/marketing interface stress the 
role of communication. However, this construct has rarely 
been explicitly modeled and operationalized [78]. Two emi- 
nent researchers in the field comment on the importance of 
organizational communication as follows: “Communication is 
the lifeblood of an organization; if we could somehow remove 
communication JI~M’s from an organization, we would not have 
an organization. Communication pervades all activities in an 
organization, represents an important work tool through which 
individuuls understand their organizational role, and integrates 
organizarional subunits” [S l ,  p. 71. Using an information 
processing perspective, the authors want 1) to examine the 
interface between R&D and marketing during the front-end 
stage to a fuller extent, and 2) provide an integration of 
organization theory with the wide variety of research traditions 
on the subject of the R&D/marketing interface. 
The research question of the present article has been phrased 
as follows: from an information processing perspective, what 
role does information transfer play in integrating R&D and 
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marketing functions during the planning stage, and what effects 
do project formalization and project centralization of R&D 
and marketing planning activities have on the eflciency of 
functioncrl uncertainty reduction? In the first section of this 
article, we will adopt an information processing view on the 
interface between R&D and marketing. A propositional model 
will be developed. Next, we review the expostfacto field study 
we have designed and conducted to test the hypotheses. The 
third section discusses the empirical findings, and expands on 
those results. Finally, we present a path analysis to gain further 
insight in the nomological network on the antecedents and the 
effects of the R&D/Marketing communication interface during 
the fuzzy front-end of an innovation project. 
11. R&D/MARKETING COMMUNICATION DURING 
THE FUZZY FRONT-END: A THEORETICAL MODEL 
A.  An Informational View on Innovation Processes 
Innovation patterns can be viewed as uncertainty reduction 
activities, as is shown by the vast majority of scholars in 
the field who have adopted this point of view [l] ,  [24], 
1311, [351, [381, [431, [571, [59l, [621, [81l, [83l, [92l, [ lol l .  
”. . . Product development is a process by which an organi- 
zation transforms data on market opportunities and technical 
possibilities into information assets for  commercial produc- 
tion. During the development process, these information assets 
are created, screened, stored, combined, decomposed, and 
transferred among various media, including human brains, 
paper, computer memory, sofmare, and physical materials. 
Ultimately, they are articulated as detailed product and process 
designs stored in blueprints and computer-aided design bases 
and eventually deployed in production processes on the factory 
floor’’ [14, p. 201. 
Innovation teams are task groups aimed at reducing un- 
certainty about the user needs, the technological and the 
competitive environment, and the needed resources for the 
project [92]. Within such a task group, persons from dif- 
ferent functions play specific roles in order to complete the 
project. Roles are the expected behavior patterns attributed to 
a particular position in an organization [40]. For instance, the 
marketing project members will be involved with uncertainty 
reduction regarding user needs, the marketing strategy of 
the competition, and the required marketing resources to 
complete the project. The R&D project members then, are 
primarily responsible for the uncertainty reduction regarding 
the technology, the technological strategy of the competition, 
and the needed R&D resources to complete the project [92]. 
It must be emphasized that in the present framework, we 
define R&D and marketing on afunctional basis, and not on 
a departmental basis. This approach is warranted, given the 
advent of flat organizational structures [69]. 
During the product innovation project lifecycle, the task 
group members gather, process and distribute information on 
the internal and external environment. Thus the task group 
reduces project uncertainty. In this article, we adopt Gal- 
braith’s definition of uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty is the differ- 
ence between the amount of information required to perform 
a particular task, and the amount of information already 
possessed by the organization [39]. Information is verbally 
encoded knowledge. By knowledge, we understand facts, 
truths, or principles, understandings derived from experience, 
exemplary practices, ideas or procedures certified as valid via 
various tests, and the findings of validated research [42]. If 
a product innovation task can indeed be viewed as closing 
uncertainty gaps about consumers, competitors, technologies 
and resources, we expect successful innovation projects to be 
characterized by a significantly greater amount of uncertainty 
reduced on these dimensions by the time the product is 
launched in the marketplace [92]. 
Hypothesis 1: The more the innovation team reduces the 
uncertainty (closes the gap between required and possessed 
information) about user needs, technology, competition, and 
the required resources, the higher the likelihood that the new 
product innovation will be commercially successful. 
B. Eflcient Uncertainty Reduction: Task 
Analyzability and Task Variabilih 
It has been customary for innovation scholars to discern 
two stages within innovation processes. During the planning 
stage, the organization collects information in order to assess 
the new product idea and to formulate a valid new product 
concept. During the development stage, this product concept 
is subsequently developed towards a product that can be 
commercially launched in the market place [25], [82], [ l o l l .  
Although empirical research has suggested that “the new 
product process is clearly poorly represented by a simple series 
model” 122. p. 61, recent research evinces the robustness of 
this two stage classification [56], [92]. Most of the proposed 
alternatives indeed incorporate two distinct stages, viz., 1) a 
stage during which the primary focus concerns idea generation 
and concept formulation, and 2) a stage during which attention 
is consequently shifted towards developing the new product 
concept [22], [93]. Also, the quality of the front-end activities 
has received widespread attention in innovation management 
studies 1201, [89], [93]. Thus the conceptualization is useful 
within the present research context. However, even Rogers 
states in his own classic work at a particular moment that: 
“We should not forget that we are art$cially and heuristically 
chopping up reality into conceptual bite-sized pieces. Although 
such processing may aid digestibility, it also adds an ersatz 
flavor” [X2, p. 1311. 
If indeed the planning stage has such an important impact 
on the final commercial outcome of the project, this must 
mean that successful task groups have maximally reduced 
uncertainty during the planning stage. Recent research by 
organization scientists indicates that task uncertainty is a 
function of task analyzability and task variability. Perrow 
[75], [76] defines tusk variability as the number of exceptions 
encountered in the execution of a task, Le., “the degree to 
which stimuli are perceived as familiar or unfamiliar” [75, 
pp. 195- 1961. Tusk anulyzubility refers to the extent to which 
there are known procedures that specify the sequence of steps 
to be followed in performing a particular task. Perrow has 
used these dimensions as a basis for the structural comparison 
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of different organizations. Later, Van de Ven and Delbecq 
[95] have expanded on Perrow's typology. They predicted 
that work units that differed along the dimensions of task 
variability and task difficulty, would be structured differ- 
ently. Their data, obtained within 120 work units in a large 
government employment-security agency, generally supported 
this hypothesis. Daft and MacIntosh [28] have employed the 
Perrow-framework to establish a relation between the task 
variability and the task analyzability characterizing a work 
unit, and the amount and the equivocality of information 
processing in a work unit. The data showed moderate support 
for their propositional model. In a more recent theoretical 
analysis, Daft and Weick 1291 have developed a conceptual 
framework on the interpretation modes of organizations. The 
assumption concerning the analyzability of the environment 
held by the organization, is a key dimension in their frame- 
work. Victor and Blackburn [99] comment on their empirical 
inquiry-a field experiment and a laboratory experiment-of 
the relation between task uncertainty and the level of task 
exceptions and search difficulty as follows: "These jindings 
suggest that the continued use of the task uncertain f?; concept 
must be questioned. Instead, organization t h e o n  may need to 
replace task uncertainty with a more elaborate constellation 
of tusk characteristics, each of which uniquely contributes 
to task uncertainty, but each of which also uniquely qfects 
organizational behavior" (p. 402). 
In a product innovation context, task variability can be seen 
as the amount and the variation by which new uncertainty 
emerges. In similar vein, task analyzability refers to the degree 
to which there are procedures to identify and reduce uncer- 
tainty. Hence, we expect the analyzability and the variability 
of the task to vary in the course of the project. Indeed. as more 
and more information is processed, task uncertainty will level 
off. We can hence expect the task analyzability to increase. as 
the project team members gain progressively more insight into 
the complex work environment, and establish procedures to 
structure their work. In addition, task variability will decrease 
as fewer and fewer exceptions are encountered in the process 
of their work. Hence, we expect commercially successful 
innovation teams to increase task analyzability and decrease 
task variability as much as possible during the planning stage 
of the innovation project (see Fig. 1) .  This is called efJicient 
uncertainty reduction 1921. 
Hypothesis 2: Commercially succrssfil product innovutiorrs 
are characterized by a maximum uncertuinh reduction during 
the planning stage of the project lifecycle. Othenvise stated, 
the commercial success of the project is positively related to 
the decrease of R&D and marketing task variability and the 
increuse of R&D and marketing task anulyzubility during the 
planning stuage of the projed lijiecycle. 
Projects will differ in terms of market newness and techno- 
logical newness. If the organization steps out of its traditional 
markets or technologies, we may assume that the starting 
situation will become even more fuzzy. Entering new markets 
implies that the task analyzability experienced by the mar- 
keting team members will be lower, and the marketing task 
variability will be higher than projects that involve product 
innovations close to the company's home base. Similarly, if 
Task Variability = V 
Task Analyzability = A Highl 
Low I ~ 
Planning Development time 
Stage Slage 
Fig. I .  
1921. 
Efficient uncertainty reduction during product innovation projects 
the organization begins a project in unknown technologies, 
the tajk analyzability faced by the R&D task group members 
will be much lower and the task variability will be much 
higher than that of projects launched in areas that show a 
strong technological cynergy with the existing expertise of the 
organization. Entering new territories implies the task group 
members cannot refer to an in-house body of knowledge that 
has been accumulated through past project team experiences 
1921. 
Hypothesis 3: ( a )  The less familiar the organization is with 
the technology of the project, the less the R&D members of 
the innovation task group will  have increased the analyzability, 
und decreaved the variability oj their activities by the end of the 
planning stage. ( 6 )  The less familiar the organization is with 
the market for  the projecr, the less the marketing members of 
the irmoration task group will have increased the analyzability, 
and decreased the rwiability of their activities by the end of 
the pltrnning stage. 
C. R&D/Murketing Communication and 
the Morphological Process 
The above framework gives us cues about the need for 
integration of R&D and marketing during the planning stage 
of product innovation processes. To understand why, let us 
first explore a scenario in which there has been no exchange 
of information between these two parties during the front- 
end stage. Marketing team members will discover at the very 
end of the project lifecycle a large number of technology 
related elements that jeopardize the intended launch strate- 
gies. For instance, they may not have used the technological 
competencies of the firm and of its network of partners to the 
fullest extent. As a consequence, the product may not hold 
a sustainable competitive advantage on certain key product 
specifications. Vice versa, task group members from R&D 
will at the end of the project be confronted with many 
commercial issues that have not been adequately dealt with. 
Consequently, they may have systematically ignored important 
product benchmarks and specifications. Both for marketing and 
R&D, many surprising elements will be discovered late in 
the innovation cycle. In addition, there will be constantly a 
mediocre insight into the procedures and the work schemes 
needed to develop and market the intended product. Thus 
without communication between task group members from 
R&D and marketing, task variability will remain high and task 
216 IEEE TRASSACTIONS OK ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT. VOL. 12. NO. 3, AUGUST 1995 
analyzability will remain low until the very end of the project. 
Many project members will not have the foggiest notion about 
the way they should handle the emerging problems and why 
these problems happened in the first place. This implies the 
complete task group will have to reformulate and redo a lot 
of the innovation activities. 
Cross functional information flows generate a morpholog- 
ical process (92. pp. 4944951. Le.. information exchange 
between the R&D and the marketing function helps these 
functions to reduce task variability and increase task an- 
alyzability [92]. Interpersonal interactions trigger a better 
analysis of the opportunities in the interrelations among mar- 
ket needs, technological possibilities, competitive strategies 
and resource capabilities [29], [60]. *’. . . mi organi:ution’s 
absorpti1,e capacity is not resident in any single incli\idual 
but depends on the links across a mosaic of indiijidircil u i -  
pahilities. (. . .) Critical knoivledge does riot simply include 
substantilv, technical knowdedge; it also includes aitnreness 
of rvhere useful complementun expertise resides rvithin and 
outside the orguni,-ution” [ 16. p. 1331. 
Communication during the planning stage is especially 
crucial, since this is the stage during which modifications, 
reorientations or drastic changes in new product plans are the 
least expensive. The innovation team can still be very flexible 
in handling the modification of design specifications. If such 
changes in the product concept occur late in the innovation 
cycle, many of the previous work efforts will have to be 
redone. This will inevitably add to the cost and the time 
delay of the innovation project. Thus efficient uncertainty 
reduction i s  only possible insofar marketing and R&D share 
as much as possible their information. their critical insights 
and their unanswered questions with each other. This spawns 
uncertainty reducing activities before the final product concept 
is formulated, accepted and developed [92]. 
Hypothesis 4: Eflcient uncertuinty redirctiori is po.siti\*ely 
related to the interjknctionul transjer of injormatiori hetit~eeri 
the project members of R&D arid inarketirig. 
D. Centralization and Formalization of Comrnirniccition F1oit.s 
The organization can intervene at the R&D/marketing com- 
munication interface. Project centralization refers to the extent 
to which project-related communication. decision-making, and 
power is constricted within the hands of a few individuals 
belonging to the top of the project team or the top management 
of the organization [82]. Centralization has been hypothesized 
to have a negative effect on cross functional information 
sharing [45]. Therefore, we expect project centralization to 
have a negative impact on the effectiveness of uncertainty 
reduction during the planning stage. 
Project formalization refers to the emphasis placed within 
the project team on following rules and procedures in per- 
forming one’s job [45]. Recent findings indicate that project 
formalization may be positively related to the quantity and the 
quality of information flows between functions [88] and the 
level of information use [ 3 2 ] ,  15.51. This is in  sharp contrast 
with previous studies that have found strong negative effects 
of formalization on cross functional information exchange [47] 
and individual innovativeness [46]. However, as Baker et al. 
[4] have pointed out. the effect of organizational formalization 
on job effectiveness may very well be curvilinear, i.e., too 
much job codification as well as too much job autonomy 
create dysfunctional effects. Therefore. we expect project 
formalization to be curvilinearly related to the efficiency of 
uncertainty reduction. While a minimum level of formalization 
is needed to bring R&D and marketing team members in 
contact with each other, too much formalization may hinder 
the adoption of innovative and creative behaviors within the 
project team and hence provide barriers to the morphological 
process [92]. 
Hypothe.ris 5: (a) Uncertuinh reduction during the plan- 
ning stage of a product innmiation project is negatively related 
to the degree of project centralization. (b)  The uncertainty 
reduction during the planning stuge is cundinearly (inverted 
C- )  related to the degree cf project ,forinulization. 
111. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. Reseorc,h Design 
Given the time-consuming nature of longitudinal studies, 
and the irregular activity pattern of innovation trajectories, we 
have conducted an ex post facto study. Indeed, a key variable 
in our theoretical framework has been the commercial success 
of the innovation project. Since the commercial outcome of an 
innovation project can very often be accurately assessed only 
two or three years after the market launch of the product, a 
longitudinal study was deemed infeasible within the research 
funding constraints. Thus although our theoretical model con- 
cerns a process model, we have essentially relied on an ex 
p m t  facto method to gain insight in these processes and their 
effects. The ex post facto design was essentially of a paired 
comparison nature, examining one commercial failure and 
one commercial success per company. This research design 
has gained widespread acceptance since the seminal SAPPHO- 
study [ 85 I .  and has become the standard design for studying 
the antecedents that lead to project failure and success [9], 
[19]-[21]. [30], [36], [63], [98]. However, there are some 
important methodological problems associated with such an 
ex post ,f(icto comparison, most notably self selection and 
hindsight bias [70]. [71], [84]. The present study has been 
designed with the aim of being a significant improvement over 
the existing practices in the field. 
Two pretests have been conducted: a study of 14 graduate 
industrial engineering students who had to develop the plan 
for a technological product innovation, and a study of 16 
innovation projects (eight successes; eight failures) at five 
Pittsburgh-based companies. These pretests showed that man- 
agement is not very eager to provide data on more than 
one failed project per company. Also, in order to avoid the 
companies to select their pet projects, which may stimulate 
hindsight bias, and to reduce rating inaccuracies [ 111, [52], 
we asked our field site contact persons to select by preference 
the last successful project. and the last failed project. 
Most innovation studies traditionally rely on one single key 
informant. This method tends to increase random as well as 
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systematic error [6], [ 5 8 ] ,  [77]. Therefore, we have collected 
data from one team member from R&D and one team 
member from marketing who had been thoroughly involved 
with the project. For each project, the R&D project member 
has answered questions which related to the R&D function. 
whereas the marketing project member replied to questions 
that pertained to the marketing function. During the field site 
visits, we made sure the respondents were very knowledgeable 
about the project. The pretest also showed that the respondents 
could more easily answer the questions if they were given a 
good description of what we understood by the planning of 
the project [ I  11. 
Finally, many of the field site contact persons and the 
respondents have participated in four feedback sessions the 
research team has organized following the collection and the 
analysis of the data. As will be shown. the debriefing of the 
research findings during these workshop sessions has helped 
us to interpret some of the study results (cf. infra). 
B. 0rgririi:ation Sample cind Field Site E n t n  Procedure 
In selecting field sites. it has been our deliberate intention 
to develop a highly heterogeneous sample of companies that 
are truly involved with product innovation [ 17. p. 751. In 
order to allow for statistical analyses, a sample siLe of at 
least 20 pairs (success-failure) was regarded as a minimum 
threshold. Anticipating for nonresponse, maverick projects, 
and other contingencies. we had initially set the goal to solicit 
the participation of at least 30 companies. All in all. we have 
contacted 61 companies and asked for their participation. For 
reasons of lack of time, internal restructuring, and absence of 
recent product innovation efforts, ten of these 61 companies 
have refused cooperation. The first author visited all the 
companies personally, and had a 11 .5  h meeting with one 
of the top marketing or R&D managers of the organization. 
During this meeting, we had ample opportunity to gain insight 
in the business of the company, its organizational structure. as 
well as its new product record. In selecting projects, we have 
asked our field site contact persons to select one commercial 
failure and one commercial success. A project was considered 
to be a success it  its commercial outcome met or exceeded 
the company’s expectations; we considered a project to be a 
failure if its commercial outcome dit not meet the commercial 
expectations. 
In the course of this process, an additional 1 1  companies 
have decided not to step into this research study, for again 
very diverse reasons (one of the departments was reluctant to 
cooperate, the R&D-facilities were located abroad, . . .). Our 
final sample hence consists of 40 companies. This has resulted 
in  a set of 78 projects we have studied: 40 successes and 38 
failures. Two companies claimed no failures during the last 
three years. All of our 78 projects had been introduced in the 
market place less than three years ago. As has been mentioned 
above, data have been collected from one key informant [IO] 
from marketing and one key informant from R&D per project. 
The key informants were core team members. They had 
fulfilled important roles throughout the course of the project, 
either as a project leader, a product champion, a product 
manager. a marketing manager or an R&D engineer. Following 
the meeting. the field site contact persons have always been 
sent a letter, reminding himher of the research requirements. 
The coordinates of the respondents have been collected via a 
designated form that was annexed to that letter. Most often, 
this form had already been discussed thoroughly during the 
meeting, such that the needed coordinates were already very 
much established when the principal investigator left the firm. 
A total of 156 questionnaires have been administered (78 * 2), 
of which 147 have been returned (= 94.2% response rate). 
The 40 companies that have participated in this study are 
all located in the northern part of Belgium or in the Brussels 
region. While the present study concerns a small sample, 
it must be observed it is composed of a very heterogenous 
set of innovative companies: eight electronics companies, six 
chemical firms. six manufacturers of industrial machinery, 
three plastics companies, two firms from the glass industry, 
two metal products suppliers. two information technology 
hardware producers, two textile companies, and the remain- 
ing nine from a wide diversity of other industries (e.g., 
biotechnology). The sample consists by and large of industrial 
product firms. The median company sales amounts to 2.2 
billion Belgian francs ($62.8 million US), the average number 
of employees is 758, the median 454. However, one must 
be careful with such data. For instance, the bioengineering 
company in our sample counts only 150 employees, of which 
120 persons are working full-time in R&D. On the other hand, 
one manufacturer of industrial machinery, employing over 
2000 persons, has only 16 engineers and technicians in R&D. 
All of the companies export a very large percentage of their 
turnover (many as high as 90-95%). Several companies are 
subsidiaries and manufacturing plants of a foreign company 
with R&D centers and facilities located in Belgium. 
C. Vulirlity o j  the Measiiremerit Instrument 
There exists a wide variety of scales in the literature on, e.g., 
task analyzability and task variability [28], [65] ,  [95]-[97], 
formalization and centralization [33], [34], [48], [MI, [ 1001, 
and innovation success 1791, [80], [93]. However, we have 
preferred to rely on the theory of the trait to develop the 
measurement instrument [64]. In addition, the meta-analysis by 
Churchill and Peter [ 131 shows that the use of existing scales 
does not necessarily result in a more reliable measurement. 
We have followed the approach outlined by Churchill 
[ 121. On the basis of an extensive literature search and the 
propositional framework, an inital pool of items has been 
formed. Conform to Loevinger’s advice [64], we have sampled 
broadly. While existing scales have partly served as inputs 
during the development of the measurement instrument, the 
final measurement scales have been the result of the two 
pretests. As mentioned above. the R&D respondent answered 
the questions pertaining to the R&D function, whereas the 
marketing respondent answered the questions pertaining to 
the marketing function. This was done in order to minimize 
random and systematic error [77], which may result if one 
asks persons to assess activities that had been conducted in 
another function. The pretests indicated one obtains more 
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Variables 
Centralimtion 
Formalization 
Curninercial \.ucce$> 
TABLE I 
CORRELATIOU A N D  D I F C ~ K ~ V C E S  Bt I \ \  tt\ PtRCEPTlO\b or 
R&D AND MARKETIW RECPOUDENTS OF T11F s \\E PROJEC I 
_1 1) I  I’ I 
0.062 ns 0.438 < 0.01 
0.009 ns 0. I15 n\ 
-0.106 ns 0.793 < 0.01 
valid and reliable data by asking respondents to assess 
how much information they had received from the other 
function (Appendix: variables 1 & 2), rather than having them 
evaluating their own communication activities. 
The final measures have been included ir i  the Applyrndi.r. 
These measures show very high internal consistency as mea- 
sured by Cronbach ( i .  Only one Cronbach (I is below the 0.50 
limit suggested by Nunnally [73] (the decrease of marketing 
variability after planning). In none of the cases, coefficient cb 
could be increased by the deletion of items. A very important 
result is presented in Table I. A paired comparison of the 
perceptions of the marketing and the R&D respondent shows 
substantive correlations (as expected). and no significant rating 
bias between R&D and marketing respondents. Only the per- 
ception of formalization during planning shows no significant 
correlation. This further lends support to the idea that the 
present research design has minimized hindsight bias. 
Feedback from the respondents has indicated that the ques- 
tionnaire was difficult to answer for “sleeper“ projects. By such 
projects, the respondents understood inno\ ation projects that 
were either long-lasting ventures or entrepreneurial start-ups. 
Such projects, they felt, usually proceed by multiple efforts. 
and are generally characterized by repeated kick-offs following 
instances of budget halts which can easily last as long as two 
or three years. Since we did not want our data analyses to 
be confounded with unreliable data. we have excluded seven 
projects. Therefore, the sample size has been limited to a 
maximum of 71 cases for the cross sectional analyses and 
31 cases for the paired comparison. Thus the results of the 
present analyses may not be generalizable to venture projects 
and entrepreneurial start-ups. 
All data have been examined prior to the analyses. The data 
behave well in terms of the distribution of \cores. Only three 
of the measures have one value with a z-score in excess of 43. 
These scores have been recoded to the last score that was not 
an outlier (941. In addition, in order to minimize type-I1 errors, 
the 0-level of significance has been set at 0.10 [SI]. [53]. 
Since the propositional framework only includes directional 
statistical hypotheses. the tr-probabilities we report on the 
tests of these hypotheses designate one-tailed probabilities 
(which we will indicate by pl). Exploratory analyses (e.g.. the 
correlation between project novelty and information flows, cf.. 
infra) are of a nondirectional nature. Hence. we have employed 
two-tailed probabilities in those instances (indicated by p ) .  
Similarly. in conventional cases such as the F-test for R2 in 
regression results. we have simply used the conventional “p.” 
IV. RESL~LTS 
A. Ail UiiL,et-toitity Reductioti Vieit. on Itinovation Success 
In the present article. we have modeled technological prod- 
uct innovation as a process of uncertainty reduction. Propo- 
sition 1 relates prqject success to the uncertainty reduction 
by the product innovation task group. In Table I, we syn- 
thesize the results of a paired analysis of successful versus 
unsuccessful innovation projects. We have used the paired t- 
test. Although the assumptions for the application of the t-test 
were met (independence, normality. homogeneity of variance), 
the rather small sample compelled us to reanalyze the data 
using nonparametric statistics. The analyses on the basis of 
the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test (paired analysis) 
generated 4milar results. Of course. the two companies where 
we have \tudied only a successful innovation project, are 
not included in the pairwise analysis. The paired comparison 
should be seen as the preferred test, since it largely partials 
out the intercompany differences. 
For the test of Hypothesis 1, we consider the uncertainty 
reduced at the end of the development stage, i.e., when 
the product is ready to be launched in the market place 
(rows 9-16 in Table 11). Hypothesis I is supported: the 
mean differences between between matched successful and 
unsuccessful projects concerning the information acquired on 
consumer\ (A.5-t. = 0.38). the information acquired on the 
marketing strategy of the competition (As-F = 0.50) and 
the information acquired on the needed marketing resources 
for the project (As-F = 0.39) are all significantly different 
from zero. However, the differences between successful and 
unsuccessful innovation seem to be more pronounced for the 
information uncertainty reduction by the R&D team members. 
Matched successful and unsuccessful projects differ by a 
substantially wider gap on the information acquired on the 
technolog) (As-F = 0.71). the technological strategy of the 
competition (A,5-F- = 0.73) and the needed R&D resources 
for the project (As-F = 0.49). Matched successful and 
unsuccessful projects differ significantly with respect to the 
aggregate measure of marketing uncertainty reduced (As-F = 
0.4 1 ) and the aggregate measure of R&D uncertainty reduced 
Previou\ research has argued that in order for a tech- 
nologically new product to be commercially successful, a 
customer-driven posture is a conditio sine qua non [21]. The 
data seem to suggest that. within the present sample, the 
quality of K&D activities is a better discriminator between 
commercial project success and failure than is the quality 
of the marketing activities. A correlational analysis points 
in the same direction: the total R&D uncertainty reduction 
correlates stronger with the measure of commercial success 
(I’ = 0.4X.p1 < 0.01) than the total marketing uncertainty re- 
duction does (1 .  = 0.16. p1 < 0.10). There are several plausible 
explanations for these results. Except for two companies, the 
(As-F = 0.63). 
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TABLE I1 
IhFOKMATlOh ACQL ISITION AND ITS IMPACT 01 INNOVATION SUCCESS 
Information acquired by the end of the Planning Stage 
1. Information acquired on consumer needs 
2. Information acquired on the marketing strategy of the competition 
3. Information acquired on the marketing resources needed for the project 
4. All marketing information acquired 
5.  Information acquired on the technology 
6. Information acquired on the technological strategy of the competition 
7. Information acquired on the R&D resources needed for this project 
8. All R&D information acquired 
Information Acquired by the end of the Development Stage 
9. Information acquired on consumer needs 
10. Information acquired on the marketing strategy of the competition 
11. Information acquired on the marketing resources needed for the project 
12. All marketing information acquired 
13. Information acquired on the technology 
14. Information acquired on the technological strategy of the competition 
15. Information acquired on the R&D resources needed for this project 
16. All R&D information acquired 
Efficient Uncertainty Reduction 
17. Increase in analyzability of marketing activities after planning 
18. Decrease in variability of marketing activities after planning 
19. Increase in analyzability of R&D activities after planning 
s 
28 
28 
28 
28 
30 
29 
30 
29 
28 
28 
28 
28 
28 
30 
30 
28 
28 
28 
29 
30 
Mean (h) 
5.02 
4.89 
4.88 
4.94 
4.83 
3.53 
5.01 
4.64 
5.38 
5.30 
5.29 
5.33 
5.86 
3.52 
5.74 
5.27 
3.08 
3.11 
3.65 
3.26 
In (information process 
Mean ( f )  
4.49 
4.63 
4.25 
4.44 
4.32 
2.59 
4.48 
3.98 
5 .OO 
4.80 
4.89 
4.92 
5.14 
2.78 
5.26 
4.63 
2.71 
2.55 
3.08 
2.78 
1 s - F  
0.53 
0.27 
0.63 
0.50 
0.5 I 
0.95 
0.53 
0.66 
0.38 
0.50 
0.39 
0.4 I 
0.7 1 
0.73 
0.49 
0.63 
0.36 
0.55 
0.57 
0.48 
t 
1.66 
.69 
1.75 
1.70 
1.54 
2.55 
1.67 
2.32 
1.40 
1.64 
1.36 
1.74 
2.36 
2.17 
1.91 
2.59 
2.18 
4.48 
3.38 
3.38 
3 )  between successful and unsuccessf 
Pl 
* 
ns 
** 
*** 
** 
* 
* 
** 
** 
** 
** 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
product 
number of oairs an analvsis is based on. The 
20. Decrease in variability of R&D activities after planning 
Ke!: This table presents a paired analysis of the differences in uncertainty reduc 
third and the fourth column show the means of the successful and the unsuccessful project on a particular measure. Column 5 shows the difference between 
success and failure (due to rounding, this may not amount exactly to the difference between columns 3 and 4). Column 6 presents the t-statistic and column 
7 shows its level of significance. All measures are measured on a 1-7 scale, except measures 17-20. which are measured on a 1-5 scale. One-tailed level of 
significance has been indicated as follows: * * *  1’1 < 0.01: * *  p1 < 0.05: * 1 1 ,  < 0.10. 
companies in this sample are all industrial product companies. 
Within such customer environments. i t  may well be that 
technical excellence is the key to market success. Moreover, 
the field site visits indicated that most of these companies 
had a very pronounced niche strategy. As a consequence 
of almost continuous intensive communications with their 
customers, they were generally very knowledgeable about 
the user needs. In a way then, this tight supplierkustomer 
cooperation provides organizations with a very accurate and 
nearly instantaneous update of new market trends. Our field 
site contact persons later commented during the debriefing 
sessions that these findings may reflect a potential scenario 
of how good projects may run. Marketing keeps a permanent 
update of user needs, and transfers a very detailed product 
specs dossier to R&D. Once this has happened, some of our 
field site contacts argued, marketing has little to add to the 
innovation process. 
B. Eficierit Uncertainty Reduction 
Hypothesis 2 is supported, as is evidenced in rows 1-8 
of Table 11. On the aggregate level, matched successful and 
unsuccessful projects differ significantly with respect to their 
scores on the aggregate measure of marketing uncertainty 
reduction (As-F = 0.50) and R&D uncertainty reduction after 
the planning stage (As-,. = 0.66). This paired comparison 
of successful and unsuccessful projects also yields significant 
results for the uncertainty reduced regarding the user needs 
(As-F = 0.53), the needed marketing resources for the 
project (As-F = 0.63), the technology (As-F. = 0.51), the 
technological strategy of the competition (As-p = 0.95) and 
the needed R&D resources for the project (As-F = 0.53). 
Observe the particularly large difference between successful 
and unsuccessful projects concerning the information acquired 
on the technological strategy of the competition. 
If we summarize these findings in a more visual presentation 
(Fig. 2), we see that successful projects have reduced on 
average as much uncertainty during the planning stage, as 
the unsuccessful projects have during the complete innovation 
cycle. Fig. 2 also highlights the fact that the major part 
of the information acquisition occurs during the planning 
stage. The development stage can then be viewed as an 
operational implementation of the information agenda that 
has been developed during the front-end stage [92]. Whereas 
the early acquisition of information about the technological 
strategy of the competition seems to be one of the major 
differentiators between project success and failure, Fig. 2 
clearly indicates that the R&D department is on average quite 
poorly informed on this issue. It should be noted however that 
the industrial nature of our sample may have partly contributed 
to this result (cf., supra). 
Proposition 2 also implies a structural hypothesis, in that it 
postulates task variability and task analyzability to be related 
to task uncertainty. The correlation analyses in Tables I11 
and IV show this conceptualization to be a valid one. These 
tables present strong evidence that task analyzability and task 
variability can be seen as alternative conceptualizations of task 
uncertainty. The correlations between task analyzability and 
task variability are rather high (T = 0.50 for the marketing 
~ 
250 
Variable 
1. Total uncertainty reduced by R&D after planning 
planning 
3. Decrease in variability of R&D tasks after planning 
2. Increase in analyzability of R&D tasks after 
User Needs 
I .  7. 3 
* 
0.68 
0.62 0.71 * 
Competitors' 
Marketing Strategy 
Needed Marketing 
Resources 
Technology 
Competitors' 
Technological Strategy 
~~ 
Needed R&D 
Resources 
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Fig. 2. Success versus failure: information acqui\ition pattern\ 
TABLE Ill 
C O R R E L U I O N  MATTKIX OF T H E  A L I E K \  XTlVr 
MEASIRES O t  R&D TASK UXCFRTAI\lY 
TABLE IV 
CORR~LATIOU M A i K i x  OF THE ALTFRUATIL t 
ME.ASIRES OF M A R K E T I N G  TASK Lr\CtRTAIVT\  
Variable 
I .  Total uncertainty reduced by marketing after 
planning 
planning 
Key: The table entrie\ represent the pearsonian correlation coefficient5 
between the three variables. All correlation coefficients are significant at 
1'1 <0.01. .\- = 68. 
function, I' = 0.71 for the R&D function). However, also 
Perrow has posited in his original work a positive correlation 
between these two constructs [75]. 
Using 1) the increase in R&D task analyzability and the 
decrease in R&D task variability during planning as regressors 
(independent variables), and 2) the aggregate measure of R&D 
uncertainty reduction after the planning stage as the regressand 
(dependent variable), the regression analysis yields a R2 of 
49.7%. A commonality analysis for variance partitioning [74] 
shows that only 30.98% of R2 is the result of unique effects. 
This is of course the result of the high correlation between the 
measures of increase in R&D task analyzability and decrease 
in R&D task variability during planning. The unique effect of 
the R&D analyzability increase (24.14%) is a lot larger than 
that of the R&D variability decrease (6.849). 
Quite similar results have been obtained for the marketing 
function. The increase in marketing task analyzability and the 
decrease in  marketing task variability after planning, explain 
54.49% of the variance in marketing uncertainty reduction 
after planning. The proportion of common effects in the 
explained variance is not so large as with the R&D respondents 
( 5  1.34%). Again, the unique effect of the analyzability mea- 
sure (31.14%) is larger than that of the variability measure 
( 17.52% ).  
The analyses provide strong support for the acceptance of 
task variability and task analyzability as important mediating 
variables in the conceptualization of uncertainty. Also, the 
increase in the analyzability and the decrease in the variability 
of both R&D and marketing project personnel differ signif- 
icantly in the expected direction between the successful and 
the unsuccessful innovation projects (Table 11, rows 17-20). 
In evaluating the size of the mean differences, the reader 
must realiLe that these constructs have been measured on a 
1 (low)-5 (high) scale. The differences are very pronounced, 
both for marketing and R&D. The increase during planning 
in the analyzability of marketing ( & - F  = 0.36) and R&D 
tasks (A.\-J- = 0.57). as well as the decrease of variability 
of marketing (Ls-F = 0.55) and R&D activities (As-F = 
0.48) differ indeed substantively between successful and un- 
successful product innovation projects. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are supported. The correlation of 
the technological newness of the project with the increase in 
R&D task analyzability (7. = -0.42) and the decrease in R&D 
task variability (7.  = -0.50) after planning are significantly 
negative (p l  < O . ( J l ) .  The impact of market newness on the 
task difficulty of the marketing project personnel seems to be 
less pronounced. The degree of association between market 
newness and marketing task analyzability increase ( r  = -0.18, 
p1 < 0.10) and the marketing task variability decrease after 
planning ( I '  = -0.27. p1 < 0.05) is less articulate. Also the 
use of the uncertainty reduction measure supports hypotheses 
3a and 3b. The more the product innovation project involves 
new technologies, the less technological uncertainty is reduced 
by the end of the planning stage ( r  = -0.37, p l  < 0.01). 
Also, market newness has a negative effect on the amount of 
uncertainty reduced by marketing task group members during 
the up-front stage ( I .  = -0.44, p 1  < 0.01). 
C. The Effects of' Iiiteifuiictioricil Infornitition Transfers 
Marketing uncertainty reduction after planning correlates 
positively with the amount of information marketing has 
received from R&D during that period (1. = 0.19.pl < 0.10). 
Also, RCGD uncertainty reduction after planning correlates pos- 
itively with the amount of information they have received from 
marketing during the planning phase (7. = 0.41. p l  < 0.01). 
Thus Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
Furthermore, the level of information transfers from R&D 
to marketing during planning relates positively to the decrease 
of marketing task variability ( 7 .  = 0.38, p l  <0.01) and the 
increase of marketing task analyzability ( r  = 0.52,pl < 0.01). 
Vice versa, communication flows from marketing to R&D 
help the team members from R&D to reduce R&D task 
variability (r .  = 0.38.pl < 0.01) and increase R&D task 
analyzability ( r  = O.40.pl < 0.01). Otherwise stated, the data 
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Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Formalization 
Formalization’ 
I ?  
R’ 
F 
P 
~ 
25 1 
I .  R&D 2. R&D 3. R&D 
Uncertainty Variability Analyzability 
Reduction After Decrease After 
Planning Planning Planning 
Increase After 
.522*** .552*** .568*** 
.145* 0.037 0.092 
65 69 61 
0.285 0.304 0.325 
12.39 14.40 15.42 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Dependent 
Variable 
Indenendent 
show that interfunctional information transfers during planning 
reduce the variability and increase the analyzability of project 
tasks. Cross functional communication reduces uncertainty that 
would have otherwise been encountered in a later stage in the 
innovation project. Thus interjimctional communication j o w s  
foster the morphological process: Information from “across 
the barrier” helps in discovering new elements (decrease 
variability) and facilitates the idenfication of ways and means 
to structure subsequent activities (increase analyzability). 
1 .  Marketing 2. Marketing 3. Marketing 
Uncertainty Variability Analyzability 
Reduction After Decrease After Increase After 
D. Structuring Information Flows for  
EfJicient Uncertainty Reduction 
Hypothesis 5.a is supported. The uncertainty reduced by 
R&D during planning relates negatively to the centralization of 
R&D activities ( r  = - 0 . 2 5 , ~ ~  < 0.05). Also, the uncertainty 
reduced by marketing during that phase of the innovation 
process relates negatively to the centralization of marketing 
activities ( r  = -0.26.pl < 0.05). Cross validation using 
the alternative conceptualization (task variability and task 
analyzability) shows that centralization of marketing planning 
activities has a significant negative effect on the increase of 
marketing task analyzability ( r  = -0.42,pl < 0.01) and the 
decrease of marketing task variability ( r  = -0.27. p l  < 0.05). 
In addition, centralization of R&D planning activities has a 
negative impact on the increase of R&D task analyzability 
( T  = -0.18.pl < 0.10) and the decrease of marketing task 
variability ( r  = -0.16.pl < 0.10). Thus the proposed etiol- 
ogy is corroborated by the data: decentralization of project 
activities fosters the efficiency of organizational information 
processing during planning. 
The evidence with concern to Hypothesis 5.b is more 
ambiguous. In order to test this hypothesis, a regression 
equation has been modeled involving the R&D uncertainty 
reduction during planning as the regressand, and the formal- 
ization of R&D project planning (RFORM) and the square of 
this measure (RFORM’) as regressors. The same procedure 
has been followed in order to test for curvilinear effects 
of marketing formalization during planning (MFORM and 
MFORM’) on efficiency of marketing uncertainty reduction. 
Operationally, we have first standardized the measure of 
formalization. Subsequently, this standardized measure as well 
as the squared transformation of this variable have been 
used as regressors. This way, one avoids multicollinearity, 
Variables I Planning Planning I Planning 
Formalization’ ~~ 1 -0.y;*** -0:;9** -0.149 67 1 
0.273 0.206 0.476 
12.01 8.30 29.09 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Key:  Tdbk entries represent standardized beta coefficients. Listwise deletion 
of missing data. One-tailed significance of the ,1 coefficients: *p1 < 0.10; 
**PI < 0.05; ***Ill < 0.01. 
as is evidenced by the high tolerances (minimum tolerance 
= 0.997). The null hypothesis is rejected in the two analy- 
ses (column 1 of Tables V and VI). Note however that 
the sign of the quadratic term is in the expected direction 
for the formalization of marketing activities (PMFORM = 
0.406: ,jlIFORhlL = -0.315). not for the formalization of 
R&D activities (PRFOR~I = 0.522:&FOR>p = 0.145). 
Hence, Hypothesis 5.b is only partly supported. 
The above analysis is further corroborated by a cross 
validation using the task variability and task analyzability 
measures. A multiple regression analysis has been performed 
using the measures of decrease of task variability (column 2 
of Table V and VI) and the increase of task analyzability after 
planning as regressors (column 3 of Table V and VI). The 
results regarding the marketing function are significant and in 
support of Hypothesis 5b. The analyses concerning the R&D 
function are not in support of Hypothesis 5b: While the signs 
correspond to the analysis using uncertainty reduction as the 
dependent variable, none of the P-values associated with the 
quadratic terms are significant. 
Our data suggest that medium formalization may be the 
least effective strategy for the R&D function. Within our 
sample, the best strategy for R&D seems to be either the 
completely informal approach or the very formal approach. A 
plausible explanation for this result emerged from the group 
feedback sessions. It may well be that projects which are low in 
formalization are longer-term projects, that need a lot of free- 
wheeling in order to be able to discover the right track. Such 
projects may not fit the more applied trammels of convention. 
Projects on the right hand side of the R&D formalization scale 
may be much more applied in nature, and may need the tighter 
control and the stricter scheduling of activities. 
For marketing, a too low as well as a too high level of 
project formalization seem to spawn dysfunctional effects. 
While past research has adopted a linear approach to the study 
of the effects of formalization on project effectiveness, the 
present analyses partly support the theoretical edification of 
Hypothesis 5b. These findings are in line with our observations 
during the many contacts with the field sites, and with the 
feedback we have obtained during the workshop sessions we 
have held with the participating organizations. Companies with 
a strong record of successful technological innovation make 
use of custom-designed product innovation plans, strategic 
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Fig. 3. Path analycia of the communication interface model 
planning and quality function deployment [44]. [SO] to involve 
marketing with the innovation program of the company. While 
we do not know of any comparative study of such tools. we 
believe these instruments are located in the middle of the 
formalization continuum. They do not provide too detailed 
a specification of what each party should do. neither do they 
leave any of the functions in a vacuum with regard to the 
product innovation activities within the organization. 
v. A NOMOLOGICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
A nomological network has been defined as an “interlocking 
system qf lnrvs“ [26. p. 651. “Yet the \ ~ i g i w ,  uimc.erlly incoi~i- 
plete nettc’ork still gii>e.s the constructs ,r,hutei,er meuning the! 
do have. ( .  . .) We do not first ‘pro\,e‘ the theor!, arid then 
ididate  the test, nor c.oni’erse!\.. In uny prohtrh/e inditctii,e type 
of irference ,from a patterii (f obsen~trtions, rve e.rumine the 
relution hetrveen the totul netrvork of theory unrl ohser\ntion.s.” 
[26, p. 691. We have employed path analysis as the analytical 
method to gain insight in the nomological network on the 
R&D/Marketing communication during the fuzzy front-end of 
an innovation project. 
In path analysis, the different constructs are linked by paths. 
A path coefficient represents the direct effect of a variable on 
another variable. Path coefficients are usually estimated by 
ordinary least squares regression [2], 171. [33]. [74]. These 
coefficients then. can be interpreted as the 5tandardized beta 
regression weights in OLS regression. Existing theory on path 
analysis entertains the assertion that a path is substantively 
meaningful if its absolute value is a least 0.05. Since i t  is a 
basic assumption underlying path analysis that the relations 
between the constructs are linear 1741. no curvilinearities have 
been included in the path analysis. 
Although the authors consider this path analysis to represent 
an integration rather than a falsification of the theoretical 
framework. it does support the theoretical framework well. 
Only one path is not substantively meaningful: the effect 
of marketing uncertainty reduction during development on 
innovation success (0.01). It was the only path that was 
not .stuti.sticully .sign$c‘unt as well. Marketing uncertainty 
reduction during development has been calculated as the 
difference between marketing information acquired at the end 
of the development stage minus the marketing information 
acquired at the end of the planning stage. The same procedure 
has been employed to measure R&D uncertainty reduction 
during development. 
In the present path analysis, we have distinguished between 
causal relations (plain lines in Fig. 3) and structural relations 
(dotted lines in Fig. 3). From the path analysis, it follows that 
task analyzability and task variability are constructs which 
need further examination in the innovation field. First, these 
two constructs are good predictors of the uncertainty construct 
(struc‘turvil relation). Second, task analyzability and task vari- 
ability tie in  very well with other important constructs in the 
nomological network (cuusal relation). “TO validate a claim 
that N tect riieusitres a cvristruct. CI noniological net surrounding 
the concrpt must exist” [26. p. 661. 
Taking into account 1 )  the substantive validity [64] of 
the measurement instrument (i.e.. the items that measure 
variability decrease and analyzability increase; Appendix: vari- 
ables 13-16), and 2 )  the feedback we have obtained from 
the debriefing workshop sessions, this lends support to the 
nomological validity [26] of our theoretical model. The path 
analysis also illustrates the morphological process. Marketing 
information helps R&D to reduce task variability and increase 
task analyzability. Similarly, information flows from R&D 
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TABLE VI1 
CORRELATION BETWEEN PROJECT NEWNESS AND INTERFUNCTIONAL 
COMMUNICATION FLOWS DURING PROJECT PLANNIYG 
R&D to Marketin 
Technological 0.03 -0.41 (”*) 
Newness 
Newness 
Key: The table entries represent Pearson product moment correlations 
between the variables. Using pairwise deletion, the sample sizes vary between 
65 and 68. The asterisks indicate the level of significance for the correlation 
coefficients (two-tailed): **  p < 0.01: * p < 0.10. 
Market -0.23 ( * )  
to marketing help marketing to reduce their task variability 
and increase their task analyzability. In successful innovation 
projects, the project team has during the planning stage 1)  
profoundly identified the actions that have to be taken for 
the development of the project (increase analyzabiEty), and 
2) challenged most of the surprises and the new elements 
that characterize a particular innovation project (decrease 
variability). Successful project teams maximize the acquisition 
and the processing of new information as much as possi- 
ble during the planning stage. Again, this suggests that the 
development stage is better viewed as the implementation 
of an innovation plan, rather than as a further uncertainty 
reduction process. Comparing the paths linking uncertainty 
reduction to innovation success, on will observe that R&D 
and marketing uncertainty reduction during planning (0.45 
and 0.29, respectively) have a greater impact on innovation 
success than R&D and marketing uncertainty reduction during 
development (0.26 and 0.01, respectively). 
The present study also demonstrates that intensifying com- 
munication flows between R&D and marketing could be a 
counterpoise for projects that venture into unknown territories, 
i.e., into new markets or new technologies. However, as it  
turns out, project teams do not act at all this way. Well on the 
contrary! Whereas R&D’s communicative behaviors remain 
unaffected by the degree of market or technological newness, 
marketing seems to be less inclined to inform R&D about 
its activities and findings if the project involves new markets 
( r  = -0.23) or technologies (T = -0.41) (Table VII). 
Ginn and Rubenstein [41] have already stated that project 
newness does not foster good interfunctional relations. Dur- 
ing the four feedback sessions we have organized with the 
organizations that have participated in this study, a number 
of plausible explanations have emerged. First, in the case 
of market newness, the feedback groups felt marketing’s 
behavior may be interpreted as some sort of groupthink [54]. 
If organizations venture into new market areas, there is a 
substantial danger for the “nzarketing knows it best” attitude 
within the commercial department of the organization. Second, 
in the case of technological newness, the feedback groups 
interpreted marketing’s behavior as resistance to change: they 
will not be very co-operative towards ideas involving new 
technologies since such technologies often imply operational 
difficulties for the marketing department. New technologies 
have a negative impact on the reduction of marketing uncer- 
tainty ( r  = -0.25. p < 0.05)  and the decrease of marketing 
task variability ( r  = -0.20.p = 0.10) during planning. The 
effect of technological newness on the increase of marketing 
task analyzability during planning is not significant (T = 
-0.05). Vice versa, market newness does not significantly 
impact on R&D uncertainty reduction during planning (T = 
-0.10). nor does it influence the increase of R&D task 
analyzability ( r  = - 0.12) or the decrease of R&D task 
variability ( r  = -0.06). Thus technological newness seems 
to have a more disturbing impact on marketing activities, than 
marketing newness has on R&D activities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The present article provides an information processing ex- 
planation for project success and failure. At the same time, 
it  highlights the impact intra-organizational communication 
flows have on project success. Communication is a prime 
feature of organizing and corporate effectiveness [ 13, [81]. 
By modeling and empirically investigating the communication 
interface between R&D and marketing during the fuzzy front- 
end of the project lifecycle, the present study wanted to gain 
a better insight in one of the key determinants underlying 
innovation success. 
The nomological network [26] we have developed includes 
an alternative conceptualization of the uncertainty construct. 
This alternative conceptualization, on the basis of the Perrow 
technology constructs, has been validated during the empirical 
tests. In addition, the morphological process [92], Le., the 
hypothesis that cross functional information sharing leads 
to an increase of functional analyzability and a decrease 
of functional variability, is supported by our data. Thus 
communication flows between functions are instrumental to 
innovation success. As expected, market and technological 
newness have a negative effect on the efficiency of uncertainty 
reduction during planning. The analysis shows that project 
planning success was substantially more difficult to achieve for 
innovation projects that venture into radically new markets or 
new technologies. It takes the innovation team more to figure 
out how the development stage has to be dealt with adequately. 
The organization can enhance uncertainty reduction by de- 
centralization of planning activities. The evidence in favor of 
medium formalization is less clear cut: while this seems to be 
the best approach for the marketing function, our data suggest 
this is the least effective approach within the R&D function. 
The present research links theories from organization sci- 
ence with earlier findings in innovation research. The major 
contribution of the present theoretical and empirical analysis 
is one of a very fundamental nature: how does uncertainty 
reduction foster innovation success, and how does communi- 
cation at the R&D/marketing interface influence this process? 
One of the major findings of the present research concerns 
the high degree of empirical correspondence between the 
analyses employing the uncertainty measure, and the analyses 
using the analyzability/variability measures. This lends further 
support to Victor and Blackbum’s [99] suggestion about 
using the Perrow typology for analyzing the relation between 
organizational structure and performance. 
The present research was limited to the study of the 
R&D/Marketing interface. Recent research indicates that 
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interfaces 1 )  with the production function [14]. [15] and 2) 
interfaces with other projects [67], [68]. [86] are equally 
important. It is the interaction between resources that 
contributes to the creation of a sustainable competitive 
advantage [ 5 ] ,  [ 161, [62] .  “Creating new knowledge does 
not occur in abstraction ,from current abilities. Rather, neic. 
learning, such as innovations, are products of ( I  firm’s 
combinative capabilities to generute new applications ,from 
existing knorcdedge” [60, p. 3911 (emphasis in original). 
Much of the information that is exchanged in an innovation 
project concerns “tacit knowledge,” i.e.. information that is 
difficult to codify [ 3 ] ,  [35] .  [72]. The present research has 
not explicitly addressed the impact of information codification 
on cross functional integration and innovation success. This 
was not feasible, given the ex post facto design we have 
implemented. Future longitudinal research must be aimed 
at gaining a more profound insight in the quantity and the 
quality of cross functional information flows. Furthermore, 
a time series design reduces the hindsight bias that tends to 
be associated with ex post facto research. Finally, an in situ 
longitudinal research enables the researcher to make a better 
assessment of organizational knowledge at different moments 
during the project lifecycle. 
APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
Below. we summarize the items that have been used to op- 
erationalize the constructs. Starred items have been reversely 
coded for computation. Total scores have been obtained by 
summing and averaging the items. All constructs needed to be 
operationalized twice (once for the marketing respondent, once 
for the R&D respondent). However, in many operationaliza- 
tions, the items for the marketing respondents were the mirror 
image of the items for the R&D respondents. For reasons 
of conciseness, we have summarized this by the statement 
“similar items as X.” The complete measurement instrument 
is available from the first author. 
I ) Variable: Informution received by R& D ,from mcirketing 
during planning (R&D respondent): 
a) Marketing gave us very little commercial informa- 
tion during the planning stage ( * )  
b) Marketing updated us very accurately of their activ- 
ities during the planning stage of this project 
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Mean = 2.6. SD = 1.01. Cronbach alpha = 0.78. 
2) Variable: Information received bx marketing ,from R&D 
during planning (Murketing respondent): 
Similar items as 1 .  Mean = 3.1. SD = 1.02. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.71. 
3 )  Variable: Total uncertainty reduced by R b D  during plan- 
ning (R&D respondent): 
a) Product design 
b) The required R&D strategy for this project 
c) The technological strategy of the competition 
d) The characteristics of the applied technologies 
e)  The choice of product technologies 
f)  The required technological resources for this project 
g) The R&D resources of the competition 
h) The choice of process technologies 
i )  The required R&D personnel for this project 
Scale: 1-7 (nothing was known-50% was 
known-everything was known). Mean = 4.3. SD = 
1.07. Cronbach Alpha = 0.87. The same items had 
to be scored again for the total uncertainty reduced 
during the development stage (however the order 
of the items had been scrambled to avoid simple 
replication by the respondent). Scale statistics for 
the development stage: Mean = 4.9. SD = 0.91. 
Cronbach alpha = 0.86. 
4) Kiriuble: Technological uncertain8 reduced by R&D 
during planning (R&D respondent): 
This measure consists of items 3.a, 3.d, 3.e, and 3.h. 
Mean = 4.6. SD = 1.56. Cronbach Alpha = 0.87. The 
scale statistics for the development stage are as follows: 
Mean = 5.5. SD = 1.06. Cronbach Alpha = 0.92. 
5 )  kr iuble:  Uncertainty ubout competitors’ technological 
strategy reduced by R&D during planning (R&D respon- 
dent): 
This measure consists of items 3.c and 3.g. Mean 
= 3.0. SD = 1.62. Cronbach Alpha = 0.75. The scale 
statistics for the development stage are as follows: Mean 
= 3.1. SD = 1 S 2 .  Cronbach Alpha = 0.78. 
6 )  Variable: Technological resource uncertainty reduced by 
R&D during planning (R&D respondent): 
This measure consists of items 3.b, 3.f, and 3.i. Mean 
= 4.7. SD = 1.21. Cronbach Alpha = 0.79. The scale 
statistics for the development stage are as follows: Mean 
= 5.4. SD = 1.04. Cronbach Alpha = 0.84. 
7) Vrrriable: Total uncertaintj reduced by Marketing during 
planning (Marketing respondent): 
a) The customer needs (user requirements) 
b) The required marketing and sales resources 
c) The competition 
d) The potential market 
e)  The buyer behavior of the potential customers 
f) The required marketing and sales personnel 
g) The marketing strategy of the competition 
h) The price sensitivity of the potential customers 
i )  The marketing strategy for this project 
Scale: 1-7 (nothing was known-50% was 
known-everything was known). Mean = 4.7. SD = 
1.12. Cronbach Alpha = 0.88. The same items had 
to be scored again for the total uncertainty reduced 
during the development stage (however the order 
of the items had been scrambled to avoid simple 
replication by the respondent). Scale statistics for 
the development stage: Mean = 5.1. SD = 1.10. 
Cronbach alpha = 0.91. 
8) Variuble: Consumer uncertainty reduced by marketing 
during planning (Marketing respondent): 
This measure consists of items 7 2 ,  7.d, 7.e, and 7.h. 
Mean = 4.7. SD = 1.25. Cronbach Alpha = 0.84. The 
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9) 
scale statistics for the development stage are as follows: 
Mean = 5.1. SD = 1.24. Cronbach Alpha = 0.89. 
Variable: Uncertainty about conipetitors’ marketing 
strategy reduced by marketing during planning (Mar- 
keting respondent): 
This measure consists of items 7.c and 7.g. Mean 
= 4.7. SD = 1.35. Cronbach Alpha = 0.61. The scale 
statistics for the development stage are as follows: Mean 
= 5.0. SD = 1.40. Cronbach Alpha = 0.77. 
10) Variable: Marketing resource uncertainty reduced by 
marketing during planning (Marketing respondent): 
This measure consists of items 7.b, 7.f, and 7.i. Mean 
= 4.6. SD = 1.36. Cronbach Alpha = 0.79. The scale 
statistics for the development stage are as follows: 
Mean = 5.1. SD = 1.20. Cronbach Alpha = 0.82. 
1 1) Variable: Technological newness (R&D respondent): 
a) There was little technological synergy between the 
required technological know-how for this project and 
our existing technological know-how 
b) We had little technological expertise in the area of 
this project 
c) This project matched nicely with the existing com- 
petencies and know-how of our R&D personnel ( * )  
d) With this project, we aimed at technologies that were 
completely new to our company 
e) We were well acquainted with the technologies to be 
applied in this project (*) 
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Mean = 2.6. SD = 0.90. Cronbach Alpha = 0.90. 
12) Variable: Market newness (Marketing respondent): 
a) There was little synergy between our existing mar- 
kets and this project 
b) We had very little marketing and sales experience in 
this market 
c) There was a good fit between this project and the 
existing skills and know-how of our marketing and 
sales personnel ( * )  
d) With this project, we entered markets which were 
completely new for our company 
e) Most of the (potential) customers for this project 
were already customer to our company prior to this 
project ( * )  
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Mean = 2.5. SD = 0.93. Cronbach Alpha = 0.81. 
13) Variable: Decrease of R&D task variability after plan- 
ning (R&D respondent): 
a) During the development stage, a lot of new ele- 
ments emerged that had not been foreseen during 
the planning stage ( * )  
b) The planning stage helped us to avoid unpleasant 
surprises during the development stage 
c) The R&D work during the planning stage was very 
useful: it helped us to uncover early in the project the 
new elements that characterized this innovation, such 
that the technological surprises during the develop- 
ment stage were limited to an absolute minimum 
d) How often have the R&D project personnel been 
confronted with surprises and unforeseen findings 
during the development stage of this project (*) 
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree, ex- 
cept 13.d, which runs from never-very often). Mean 
= 3.0. SD = 0.70. Cronbach Alpha = 0.74. 
14) Variable: Decrease of marketing task variability after 
planning (Marketing respondent): 
Similar as 13. Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.69. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.49. 
15) Variable: Increase of R&D task analyzability afterplan- 
nirig (R&D respondent): 
a)  The planning stage had resulted in a clear techno- 
logical action plan that had to be realized during the 
development stage of this project 
b) The planning stage indicated clearly how we had to 
handle this project during the development stage 
c)  After the planning stage, we had a good insight of the 
activities we had to carry out during the development 
stage 
d) During the planning stage, we determined accurately 
the procedures we had to follow during the devel- 
opment of this project 
e)  How many of all the separate R&D activities to 
be performed during the development stage of this 
project had already been indicated and specified 
during the planning stage of this project? 
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree, ex- 
cept 15.e, which runs none-all). Mean = 3.4. SD = 
0.79. Cronbach Alpha = 0.90. 
16) Variable: increase of marketing task analyzability after 
planning (Marketing respondent): 
Similar as 15. Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.80. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.84. 
17) Variable: R&D perception of project centralization dur- 
ing planning (R&D respondent): 
a) Communication between R&D and marketing dur- 
ing the planning stage was mainly limited to an 
interaction at the top-level of our company 
b) A lot of informal, face-to-face contacts took place 
at all levels between R&D and marketing during the 
planning stage ( * )  
c )  During the planning stage, R&D and marketing 
communicated mainly through their superiors 
d )  The important decisions during the planning stage 
were taken by the top people of the company 
e )  The exchange of information between R&D and 
marketing occurred at all levels during the planning 
stage: top, middle-management, as well as project 
members ( * )  
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.85. Cronbach Alpha = 0.75. 
18) Variable: Marketing perception ofproject centralization 
during planning (Marketing respondent): 
Similar as 17. Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.94. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.79. 
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In the path analysis, we have pooled the perceptions 
of the R&D and the Marketing respondent per project 
f o r  the measurement of project centralization (i.e., vari- 
ables 17 and 18). Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.77. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.82. 
19) Variable: R&D perception of project formalization dur- 
ing planning (R&D respondent): 
There were precise dates for the start and the com- 
pletion of the activities to be undertaken during the 
planning stage 
R&D was given very specific jobs to do during the 
planning stage of this project. 
The planning stage was totally unstructured: every- 
body was allowed to do almost as he pleased ( * )  
During the planning stage, project progress was 
monitored by means of formal procedures (mile- 
stones, budgets, actions undertaken) 
The planning stage proceeded by means of a well 
documented action plan 
Scale: 1-5 (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.95. Cronbach Alpha = 0.86. 
20) Variable: Marketing perception of project formalization 
during planning (Marketing respondent): 
Similar items as 19. Mean = 2.8. SD = 0.97. 
Cronbach Alpha = 0.86. 
In the path analysis, we have pooled the perceptions 
of the R&D and the Marketing respondent per project 
for  the measurement of project formalization (i.e., vari- 
ables 19 and 20). Mean = 2.9. SD = 0.73. Cronbach 
Alpha = 0.81. 
21) Variable: Marketing and R&D perception of project 
success (Marketing respondent and R&D respondent): 
To what extent did the project achieve the inital 
commercial objectives and expectations? 
How would you describe the commercial success of 
this project? 
The scale runs from 1-5 for each item. The 
anchor points for the first item are “far below ob- 
jectives”-“far above objectives.” The anchor points 
for the second item are “very unsuccessful”-“very 
successful.” The first item has only been answered 
by the marketing respondent, the second item has 
been answered by both the marketing and the R&D 
respondent for the project. Mean = 2.7. SD = 1.2. 
Cronbach Alpha = 0.91. 
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